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Cem Karayalcin†
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Abstract
Recent literature on developing countries has revived interest in structural
change involving the reallocation of resources from agriculture to industry. Here,
we focus on the first such historically important structural transformation in which
some parts of Europe escaped from the Malthusian trap centuries earlier than the
Industrial Revolution, while others stagnated. There is as yet no consensus as to
the causes of this First Great Divergence. The paper advances the thesis that what
lies at the root of diﬀerent paths is the type of property rights inherited. As popu-
lations everywhere in Europe recovered from the catastrophes of the late medieval
period, what mattered for the direction taken was the size of the landlord class
and their landholdings. In western Europe where peasant proprietors tilled small
plots, increases in population levels led to lower real wages. Given the low incomes
of landlords and peasants, demand for manufactured goods remained low. At the
other extreme, in eastern Europe, second serfdom kept wages low, and rents high.
Yet given the small size of the land-owning class, these rents could not generate
enough demand for high-end manufacturing processes either. Northwestern Eu-
rope, being in the middle in terms both of the size of the landholding classes and
their properties, prospered as wages failed to decline even when population levels
rapidly rose. Combined demand from landlords and workers kindled an expansion
of the manufacturing sector.
⇤I am grateful to Andre Burgstaller, Eric Jones, Patrick O’Brien, and the participants of the Insti-
tutions and Geography session of the 2012 American Economic Association Meeting and of the 2012
Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, for helpful suggestions.
†Address: Department of Economics, Florida International University, FL 33199, USA, Telephone:
305-348-3285, e-mail: karayalc@fiu.edu.
1 Introduction
There has recently been a revival of interest in the development literature on structural
change that reallocates resources from agriculture to industry.1 In what follows, I focus
on one of the earliest and historically most significant episodes of such a transformation
that propelled relatively underdeveloped regions of northwestern Europe into economic
prominence.
To see what is involved note that sixteenth century England was a marginal agrarian
economy with an urbanization level below that of the Balkans.2 The urban manufac-
turing core of Europe was located (with the exception of the precocious Low Countries)
along the shores of the Mediterranean. By 1850, a “reversal of fortune” had given Eng-
land the lead with an income per capita that far exceeded that of the previous leader
Italy.3
The traditional answer to the question of how this reversal took place focused on
the “Industrial Revolution” as the event that radically broke with the past of humanity,
ushering in a new phase where, for the first time ever, “production started to grow
much more rapidly than population.” The recent analytical (as opposed to historical)
literature dates the break to around 1800, prior to which it is supposed that a Malthusian
mechanism operated to pull incomes down to some stable, constant level whenever they
happened to exceed it.4
It is, therefore, paradoxical that in the last few years accumulated evidence has led
a growing number of economic historians to question some of the basic tenets of the
received wisdom concerning the timing, prehistory, and eﬀects of the Industrial Rev-
olution and the Malthusian transition. First, the currently accepted view is that the
Industrial Revolution was much less of an abrupt transition, with earlier growth esti-
mates of the British economy in the classic Industrial revolution era, 1760-1830, being
reduced by more than half.5 Given that in the mid-nineteenth century England had the
1See, among others, Gollin et al. (2002), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Duarte and Restuccia (2010),
Herrendorf et al. (2013b), and Gollin and Rogerson (2014).
2Bairoch, 1989, p. 179 puts the level of urbanization in Balkans and England in 1500 at 7-12% and
7-9% respectively.
3The relevant figures for GDP per capita in Maddison 2001 are as follows. In 1500 Italy led the
world with $1100 (in 1990 international $), while Belgium, the Netherlands and England followed with
$875, $754, and $714. By 1870, England had moved forward with $3191, as opposed to $2753, $2697,
and $1499 of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.
4See Galor and Weil (2000) and Lucas (2002).
5For the modest growth in per capita income and real wages in Britain between 1770 and 1850, see
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highest income in the world, the lower growth estimates immediately raise the question:
“If the industrial revolution was not substantial enough to explain England’s lead in
1850, where did it come from?”6 Second, an implication of lower growth rates is that
the contrast with the earlier periods in terms of incomes is now revealed to be not as
sharp as once thought, making pre-industrial Britain as well as a number of neighboring
countries more prosperous. Evidence from a variety of sources, including probate and
pauper inventories, point to a “consumer revolution” in Britain and the Netherlands,
with significant increases in the quantity, variety and quality of consumer goods being
registered well before the Industrial Revolution.7 Third, research on the history of En-
glish real wages indicates that they did not display a trend from 1500 to 1850, despite
a sevenfold rise in population.8 These findings indicate that the economic expansions
experienced by the English and Dutch economies in the crucial three-hundred-year pe-
riod prior to the Industrial revolution were very important achievements, constituting a
marked departure from the Malthusian past. For the first time in western history, these
economies kept pace with the population for a remarkably extended period of time.
While these considerations do not diminish the importance of the classical Industrial
Revolution as a watershed event, they call for a more nuanced approach to the economic
and social transformations that took place in the period leading to it. That this period
should be subject to closer scrutiny follows from the revised assessments of historians of
economic growth, who argue that the Industrial Revolution can no longer be regarded “as
the beginnings of growth altogether but as the time at which technology assumed an ever-
increasing weight in the generation of growth” (Mokyr (2005)) and that the “accumulated
evidence for an earlier increase in per capita income in northwestern Europe paired with a
major refinement of material life casts serious doubt on the orthodoxy that the Industrial
Revolution was the actual starting point for long-term economic growth” (de Vries, 2008,
p.6). 9
Once the roots of long-term growth are seen to be planted in an era earlier than has
traditionally been accepted, the question that immediately arises is the one concerning
Crafts and Harley (1992), Crafts (1985), Feinstein (1998), Mokyr (2004), and Williamson (1984).
6This is the question posed by Allen (2001).
7See de Vries (1994) andde Vries (2008).
8See Feinstein (1998) and Clark (2005) for English wages and Allen (2001) for the history of prices
and wages in a number of European cities. Brown and Hopkins (1956) find the same pattern in their
study of provincial wages.
9See also Clark (2005) who writes “[t]hus the Industrial Revolution is not clearly an abrupt break
around 1800 from a stagnant economy. It may just be the acceleration of a process of modern growth
that began about 150 years earlier.”
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the nature of this period and the determinants of the extensive growth registered.10 To
start with, note that even such extensive growth is restricted to a few regions in north-
western Europe: England and the Low Countries. The rest of both western and eastern
Europe lagged behind. This is reflected most importantly in the wage and price series
collected by Allen (2001) which shows that while England and the Low Countries enjoyed
a slight lead in terms of real wages relative to the rest of Europe in the fifteenth century,
incomes significantly diverged in the next three centuries. The divergence is mostly ex-
plained by the fall in continental real wages by half, while real wages remained roughly
constant in northwestern Europe.11 Thus, while England and the Netherlands escaped
the infamous “seventeenth century crisis,” the rest of the continent mostly succumbed
to it.12
This escape from the crisis was accompanied by a “consumer revolution,” that found
its expression in “a steady rise, generation by generation, of the number, range, and
quality of material possessions” (de Vries, 2008, p. 124). Detailed regional studies cov-
ering areas as diverse as the Dutch countryside (Kammermans (1999) cited in de Vries,
2008), the English county of Kent (Overton et al. (2004)), London (Earle (1989)), and
Edinburgh and Glasgow (Nenadic (1994)) and income groups from the rich to middling
groups to paupers (McCants (2008), Styles (1994)).
The increased demand was met by substantial increases in manufacturing output.
In England per capita cloth output more than doubled between the later fifteenth cen-
tury and the 1640s. Import substituting English glassworks drove continental window
panes out by the 1590s, bottles by the 1620s and drinking glasses and mirrors in the
next decade. Around 1650 forty water-powered paper mills were in operation barely five
decades after the opening of the first viable one. Iron output quintupled between 1550s
and 1650s. Similar changes were observed for coal. In the Netherlands even more dra-
matic increases were registered in a wide variety of industries. Leiden’s cloth output rose
from 26,600 pieces in 1584 to 144,700 in 1664. Haarlem’s bleaching industry processed
10It is “extensive” growth as per-capita incomes increased very moderately, if at all. “Intensive” i.e.
long-run per-capita income growth is observed only after the Industrial Revolution proper.
11Everywhere real wages were subject to fluctuations, Thus, in the Low Countries, real wages declined
slowly, but much more so than their counterparts on the continent. Real wages declined in England in
the sixteenth century and then reversed course, rising slowly later on up to their previous levels.
12Additional evidence of divergence is obtained from international comparisons of body size and
height. For the late eighteenth century, the evidence summarized by Floud (1992) indicates that the
British and the Dutch were the tallest people in Europe, while the French, Italians, and Spanish were
shorter. Austrians and Hungarians were also of smaller stature (Komlos (1989)).
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about 100,000 pieces in 1628 while it had only processed 20,000 in 1586. Amsterdam
developed a rich portfolio of manufactures such as silk weaving and dying, leather work-
ing, diamond cutting, glass blowing and food processing: it had sixty sugar refineries in
1661 up from three in 1605.13
The period also witnessed technological advances, some of which were “almost as
dramatic as those in textiles in the Industrial Revolution”.14 Examples are legion. For
instance, glassworks, gunpowder, nails, spectacles, and printing all saw substantial pro-
ductivity gains. The “Dutch” loom was invented in 1604 and was in use in Leiden in
1610. New techniques used in producing kersey represented a productivity gain of 40-
60 percent over Yorkshire broadcloth.15 High fixed costs associated with wind-powered
fulling mills did not prevent them from being adopted. These lowered the labor require-
ments dramatically and led to the near-collapse of the powerful Dutch fulling guild. New
technologies employed by shipping yards enjoying economies of scale reduced the cost of
Dutch ships 40 percent below that of the English ones in 1669.16
What then can account for this early period of economic expansion that constitutes
the starting point for modern growth? One prominent answer, that of North17, dates
the English break with the past to the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The establishment
of a constitutional monarchy and the security of property rights that followed is then
argued to have promoted economic growth through a number of channels, all of which
have been recently convincingly contested. Thus, for instance, studies of interest rates
have been unable to find any growth promoting consequences of the Glorious Revolution
(Clark 1996, Epstein (2000), Quinn (2002)). Others have shown that parliamentary rule
in England led to taxes that exceeded those of absolutist France (Hoﬀman and Norberg
(1994), Bonney (1999)). Finally, and most importantly for my purposes here, it is now
clear that England’s economic expansion had begun long before the Glorious Revolution
13See DuPlessis (1997) and the extensive literature cited therein.
14This is how Clark 2003 describes the productivity gains in printing.
15Duplessis (1997).
16Despite these changes, we do not, however, observe any significant TFP growth in this period. But
this is also true not only for the classical Industrial Revolution era (1760-1830) but also the four decades
that follow it. Clark argues that in this period “[m]ost of the economy saw no TFP growth, and the
national TFP gains mostly came from one industry, textiles. Textiles contributed a large amount of
national TFP growth because it met all three conditions above: it began as a substantial industry, its
share of consumption did not decline with price declines, and there grew up a huge external market
which eventually absorbed more than half of output. Absent textiles there would have been no change
in the trend in TFP growth all the way from 1600-1869.” (Clark 2003, p. 46)
17See North and Thomas (1973) and North and Weingast (1989).
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(Allen (2001), Clark (2003), de Vries (2008)). This is in contrast to Acemoglu et al.
(2005), who emphasize the role of Atlantic trade in the rise of northwestern Europe.
They argue that the American and Asian trades gave rise to a politically influential
merchant class that demanded and obtained protection of property rights, which, in
turn, paved the way for economic growth. Though this mechanism undoubtedly played
a role later on, as Allen (2003), building on the work of Davis (1973) and Rapp (1975),
points out the rise of northwestern Europe and the decline of Italy predates the rise
of Atlantic trade by a century. A third answer, proﬀered by De Vries, emphasizes an
“industrious revolution” taking place in northwestern Europe during the “long eighteenth
century.” This revolution is said to have involved an increase in market-oriented labor
by households who were eager to satisfy their new consumption goals. Thus, there was
a simultaneous rise in both specialized production by households and their purchase of
consumption goods with, however, a “consumer revolution” leading the way and provid-
ing the impetus to the increased production of consumer goods (de Vries (2008)). While
this approach accounts for the observed increases in labor supply to markets, the rise of
market production, and the consumer revolution, it is not of much help in answering as
to why there was a reversal of fortune, i.e., why it fell to northwestern Europe to take
the lead in these developments. Allen, whose work has focused squarely on this reversal
of fortune, credits the success of this region to its productive agriculture, which, he in
turn attributes to its vigorous urban economy (Allen (1998), Allen (2000), Allen (2003)).
However, as Allen himself recognizes, the expansion of the latter is itself endogenously
determined, while the initial level of urbanization, which can be taken as an exogenous
variable, will not work for England because urbanization levels were substantially lower
in England than either in Italy or Spain.18 If these attempts at explaining the success of
Northwestern Europe are not fully satisfactory, what other complementary mechanisms
might have been at work?
The mechanism I highlight in this paper operates through the diﬀerences in the
property rights in land that diﬀerent European regions inherited from their past as a
result of the political success of diﬀerent segments of the medieval societies from which
they emerged. For the purposes of the argument, it helps to think of Europe at the
18This last point is also made by Allen when he compares England and Netherlands to France and
Germany on the one hand and Italy and Spain on the other (Allen (2008)). The other key feature Allen
cites for success, participation in the intraeuropean trade (which preceded by a century the rise of the
Atlantic trade emphasized by Acemoglu et al. (2005) and is more in line with the dating of the rise of
northwestern Europe) would not do either as many eastern European countries participated heavily in
this trade but remained economic failures.
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beginning of the sixteenth century as being composed of three regions: the northwest
(England and the Low Countries), the east (Europe east of Elbe), and the rest of western
Europe. For various historical and political reasons, each region was characterized by a
diﬀerent set of distribution of rights to land. At one extreme were countries like France
and western Germany, where at the end of the medieval era, in alliance with monarchs
and princes, peasants were successful politically against feudal lords and ended serfdom
with full legal recognition of their property rights to plots of land. Though these plots
were initially relatively large, towards the end of the sixteenth century rising population
and the subdivision of land (the famous Frenchmorcellement) left this region with a large
class of peasant proprietors working on small plots of land. Thus, by 1550 for instance,
88 percent of the peasant properties were under 6.2 acres even in the more advanced
Paris region.19 At the other extreme, east of Elbe, where the political domination of
the feudal lords gave them the ability to reintroduce the “second serfdom,” that is to
redefine peasants as unfree and tied to the expanded estates of their lords. Here a small
group of lords ended up with substantial holdings of land upon which peasants, who
were legally unable to move elsewhere, were forced to work. In Poland, for example, 80
percent of the peasant population had by 1650 holdings of no more that 20 acres when
a typical family of 7.5 equivalent adults would not have been able to sustain itself on 40
acres.20 Similarly, in Bohemia by the mid-seventeenth century, the nobility, the church,
the towns, and the crown owned practically all the land, leaving peasant freeholders a
mere 0.5 percent of the total (Klima (1979)). The northwestern European landholding
pattern remained in between these two extremes as neither feudal lords nor peasants
were able to dominate politically to the extent their counterparts did in the east or west
of Europe. Thus, by the end of the sixteenth century, land holdings of English farmers
averaged around 60 acres, substantially larger than the plots of, say, French farmers or
their medieval counterparts.21 These English farmers either owned their land or had
it “directly under their control” (Campbell (1942)). A recent survey of the literature
concludes that England in the period under consideration was “unambiguously a peasant
19See Jacquart (1974), Meuvret (1971), Duby and Wallon (1995-1976) and Brenner (1982) on the
“pulverization” of land holdings in France.
20See Maczak (1968), Zytkowicz (1968), and Millward (1982).
21See Allen (1992). O’Brien (1996) argues that 1066 is not an inappropriate date to take as the start
of divergence of property rights regimes in England and France. This is because the consolidation of
Norman rule that followed led to major changes in the distribution of landownership and the status of
indigenous populations in England. By the twelfth century the latter were largely enserfed, while in
France serfdom had waned over large areas of Europe.
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society in which ’owner-occupancy’ reached its apogee early in the seventeenth century’
(Smith (1998), p. 371).22 I argue below that an important element in the mechanism
that helps explain the great divergence of early modern European economies and the
start of modern growth is this diﬀerence in the distribution of landed wealth. The
reasoning behind the mechanism combines three elements. First of these is the observed
twelfth and thirteenth century recovery of population levels everywhere in Europe from
the catastrophic declines wrought by Black Death. The second is the diﬀerential rise in
agricultural productivity in diﬀerent parts of Europe. A mechanism a la Boserup (1981)
that connects the first two elements is assumed here.23 The third element is similar
to the one described by Murphy et al. (1989) where industrialization of certain sectors
requires large enough domestic markets. Increasing returns technologies need to secure
enough demand to cover fixed costs and break even. For this to happen over a wide range
of sectors a broad spectrum of the population needs to have enough income to demand
manufactured goods.24 In eastern Europe with its second serfdom and a small group of
feudal lords siphoning oﬀ the income generated in agriculture, these conditions were hard
to meet. In western Europe, where the population mostly consisted of peasant farmers
with small plots, the combination of population growth and productivity increases was
not conducive to a rise in agricultural incomes and individual landowners did not earn
enough to generate enough demand for and, thus, to support a wide range of industries.
It was only in northwestern Europe where landholdings were neither too small nor too
large that the combination of higher population levels and productivity advances led to a
relatively large number of households earning high enough income to demand a broader
spectrum of goods.25
22Allen (1992) and Habakkuk (1940), inter alia, argue that the eighteenth century marked the end of
the English peasantry, with land being increasingly concentrated in the hands of large landlords in the
period corresponding to the classical industrial revolution. See also Beckett (1984) on this.
23Boserup (1981) argues that an increase in population forces farmers to open up more land in order to
keep output from falling. Once all available land is used, they switch to a new set of farming techniques.
de Vries (2008) adopts this line but emphasizes market incentives in explaining the induced a rise in
productivity. Kremer (1993) finds that in the very long run higher population induces technological
change. Galor and Weil (2000) assume that an increase in population leads to higher productivity
growth.
24Obviously, for the argument to work exports must be either completely choked oﬀ or insignificant.
In the period in question exports of manufactured goods were at best a negligible proportion of output.
25In Spain land ownership was higly concentrated with the Spanish church being one of the largest
landholders, controlling 20 percent of Castillian land by the end of the sixteenth century. In addition,
silver and gold from Spanish colonies in the New World fueled the Habsburg wars and inflation, which
coupled with the relatively high customs duties that restricted domestic and international trade stifled
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Parts of the argument adopted in the paper have their precedents in the analytical
literature. Galor et al. (2009) build a model where inequality in landownership prevents
the adoption of institutions promoting human capital formation. This is a setup where
powerful landlords delay the implementation of education reforms, slowing the process
of industrialization and the transition to modern growth. The model is thus comple-
mentary to the present one as it explicitly focuses on a period (from 1820 on) where
human capital formation became important. Murphy et al. (1989) emphasize the role
of demand for industrialization, however the mechanism in their model depends on a
fraction of the labor force receiving profits and rents in addition to wages, an assumption
that is hard to maintain for the period in question here.26 Bilancini and D’Alessandro
(2008) provide an extension of the Murphy et al. (1989) model to the case where only
a fraction of the population owns land and discuss the various scenarios that give rise
to diﬀerent levels of industrialization. However, they confine their attention to a static
model where workers only earn subsistence wages and thus cannot diﬀerentiate between
the three European cases discussed here. Their setup, however, like the one here, em-
phasizes the role played by demand in determining the extent of industrialization.27
Recently, Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) have explored the role of income inequality in
a model with demand-induced innovations. They show that changes in the distribution
of income aﬀect demand for goods and the incentive to innovate and, thus, long-run
growth. Further, like Murphy et al. (1989), Bilancini and D’Alessandro (2008), and the
present paper, they also adopt hierarchical preferences which are crucial for the model
presented below. 28
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and derives
the basic results concerning the divergent paths taken by diﬀerent European regions be-
fore the classical Industrial Revolution. It shows that under certain historically-justified
restrictions on the parameters of the model, one can derive diﬀerent wage, land rent,
the agricultural sector.
26This assumption in Murphy et al. (1989) also implies that those who receive land rents also receive
the same share of profits out of income. This makes it impossible to study the independent eﬀect of
land distribution in their setup.
27Earlier Mokyr (1977) had rejected a role for demand for the classical Industrial Revolution. The
counter arguments of Ben-Shachar (1984) are valid below as population growth and the associated rise
in agricultural productivity provide exogenous factors that aﬀect demand. Bairoch (1997) argues that
increases in demand played an important role in the classical Industrial Revolution.
28Matsuyama (2002) uses hierarchical preferences of the type below to explain the rise of “mass
consumption societies.” Herrendorf et al. (2013a) argue that non-homothethic preferences adopted here
are key to understanding the evolution of expenditure shares over time.
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labor supply, and “industrialization” levels for the three regions in which our interest
lies. Section 3 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Saving, Consumption, and Labor Supply Decisions of Agents
A given economy is populated by a mass of N agents, of which there are three types:
workers, landlords, and (potentially) entrepreneurs (denoted by superscripts L, R, and
E below). In addition to possible wage income, landlords earn rents, r, on the land they
own, while entrepreneurs earn profits ⇡. Each agent lives for one period and decides (1)
how much to spend on consumption, (2) how much labor to supply, (3) whether to leave
bequests to oﬀspring or not, and (4) how to allocate his consumption across goods. This
last decision is made in the second stage of a two-stage process, the first stage of which
involves decisions (1)-(3).
2.1.1 Point-in-time Consumption, Saving, and Labor Supply
At the first stage the agent maximizes29
U = ⌘c lnC + ⌘b ln(⌥+ b
0) + ⌘l ln(1  l)
where ⌘j, (j = c, b, l) and ⌥¯ are non-negative constants, and l, C, and b0, denote labor
supply of a wage earner, a consumption aggregator, and bequests to oﬀspring. The
budget constraint of the agent is given by
C + b0  I
with I = wl + yi + b (i = L,R,E) and b, and yi denoting bequests received from
parents and non-wage income (i.e. rents, r, and profits, ⇡, earned by landlords and
entrepreneurs respectively and derived below). Bequests to oﬀspring b0 are constrained
to be non-negative. Defining ⌥ ⌘ ⌘c⌘b⌥, it is straightforward to solve for C and b0 as
b0 =
(
⌘b
⌘b+⌘c
(I  ⌥) if I > ⌥
0 if I  ⌥ (1)
29See Galor and Moav (2004) for the use and implications of a similar log-linear utility function that
yields savings as an increasing function of wealth.
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C =
✓
1
⌘b + ⌘c
◆
(⌘cI + ⌘b⌥) . (2)
Thus, agents leave bequests to their oﬀspring only if their incomes exceed a threshold
level.30
Having decided how much of his income will be used for consumption, in the second
stage the agent decides how much to buy of each available good. These are of two types:
a homogeneous agricultural good (“food” for short henceforth), the price of which is
taken to be the numeraire, and a continuum [0,1) of manufactured goods. Each good
indexed by its distance q from the origin. All agents have identical but hierarchical
preferences over goods, with the consumption aggregator C given by31
C =
(
cf for cf  $
$ +
R q
0 min {1, x(q)} dq for cf > $
where cf denotes food consumption, $ is the minimum amount of food that needs to be
consumed before agents start buying manufactures, q is such that for q✏[0, q) commodity
q is consumed, and x(q) = 1 if good q is consumed, zero otherwise. In this formulation
agents first buy food and then (provided their income is high enough to purchase $ units
of food) buy one unit of each manufactured good following the order in the interval. In
what follows, I will assume that $ = ⌥, i.e., agents will start leaving bequests only after
they meet their food requirements.32 Agents with higher incomes buy the same goods
as their poor counterparts plus more manufactures. As incomes rise what used to be
luxuries eventually turn into necessities.
Labor supply is given by
l =
(
[(⌘c + ⌘b + ⌘l) ⌘cw]
 1 [(⌘c + ⌘b) ⌘cw   ⌘l⇤] > 0 if (⌘c + ⌘b) ⌘cw > ⌘l⇤
= 0 if (⌘c + ⌘b) ⌘cw < ⌘l⇤
(3)
where ⇤ ⌘ (⌘cb+ ⌘b⌥ + ⌘cyi) (for i = L,R,E).33
It is useful to make the following historically realistic assumption34
30Note how property rights through the distribution of land holdings aﬀect incomes and, thus, be-
quests.
31Here I follow the formulation of Bilancini and D’Alessandro (2008).
32Relaxing this assumption does not change the basic insights gained from the paper but unnecessarily
complicates the algebra.
33Note that l = 1 if ⌘l = 0. It is also straightforward to show that labor supply, l, is an increasing
function of the wage.
34See below for the implications of relaxing this assumption.
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Assumption 1. yi (i = R,E) is above a critical level such that (⌘c + ⌘b) ⌘cw < ⌘l(⌘cb+
⌘b$ + ⌘cyi), while yL = 0 and (⌘c + ⌘b) ⌘cw > ⌘l(⌘cb+ ⌘b$)
Given equation (3), Assumption 1 implies that landlords and entrepreneurs do not
supply labor, while workers receive only wage income.
Now, for future purposes, consider a worker who does not receive a bequest, b, from
parents (b = 0). Then there is a wage level, ew at which the agent chooses not to leave a
bequest, i.e. b0 = 0, or equivalently, from 1, I = ⌥ = ewel( ew) (which implicitly defines el).
Note that then all income is consumed: C = eC ⌘ I = $. First-order conditions yield
⌘lec = ⌘l✓ = ⌘c ew(1 el) = ⌘c ew(1  ✓/ ew). Solving this we get the critical wage level below
which the worker does not leave bequests
ew = (⌘c + ⌘l)
⌘c
$.
2.1.2 Steady-State Consumption, Saving, and Labor Supply
At a steady state we have b0 = b = b. Thus, the budget constraint C i = I i   b0i =
wli + yi + b  b0 = wli + yi (with li = 0 (i = R,E), yL = 0 yR = r, yE = ⇡) at a steady
state. Now the first-order conditions of the worker’s problem imply
l =
⌘c
⌘c + ⌘l
(4)
and equation (1) yields
b
L
=
⌘b
⌘c
✓
⌘c
⌘c + ⌘l
w  $
◆
. (5)
Similarly, for landlords and entrepreneurs we obtain
b
i
=
⌘b
⌘c
 
yi  $  , i = R,E. (6)
2.1.3 Stability
Given bit+1 = ⌫(wli+yi+ bt  ✓) (⌫ ⌘ ⌘b/(⌘b+⌘c) < 1) for the bequest levels to converge
a suﬃcient condition is that     @bit+1@bt
     = ⌫ @yit@bt + 1
 
< 1.
For a given wage rate, for the workers, we have @bWt+1/@bwt = ⌘b/(⌘c + ⌘b + ⌘l) < 1
8bwt . As ⌫ < 1 and with yRt = R/M we have @y
R
t
@bt
= 0; thus, the stability condition also
holds for the landlords.
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2.2 Production and Incomes
2.2.1 Agriculture
In the “agricultural sector” food is produced using land, T, and labor, Lf , under constant
returns to scale. The agricultural production function is given by
QA = AF (T, Lf ) (7)
where A is a productivity parameter and F (., .) is a constant returns to scale production
function and the aggregate amount of land T in a given economy is fixed.
Assuming that all agents are able to aﬀord to buy the minimum amount of food, $,
goods market equilibrium in agriculture can be used to determine agricultural employ-
ment
$N = AF (T, Lf ) (8)
where $N denotes demand for food.
Agricultural wages are a function of agricultural employment with wA = w(Lf ),
w0(Lf ) < 0 following from the level of agricultural employment determined by equation
(8). Note that this formulation is more general than but is consistent with workers being
paid the marginal product of their labor services.
Landlords with mass M own all the land. The distribution of land across landlords,
though typically non-uniform historically, is taken to be uniform here. This would be a
justified simplification to the extent that the focus is on the interaction between landlords
on one hand and landless workers and other agents on the other, as is the case here.
Total rents earned by landlords, R, follows from equation (8) and the wage equation as
R = AF (T, Lf ) wLf . Each landlord, then earns rents r = R/M. This implies that the
higher is the number of landlords, ceteris paribus, the lower will be the rents earned by
a landlord.
2.2.2 Manufactures
Each manufactured good is produced in a separate sector that is small relative to the
rest of the economy. There are two technologies available for the production of any good
q: (1) a traditional constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) one which requires the use of ↵ units
of labor to produce one unit of a manufactured good, and (2) an increasing-returns-to-
scale (IRS) technology that requires a fixed investment of k units of labor and   units
of labor per unit of output with 0 <   < ↵. Labor is free to move across firms using
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diﬀerent technologies. Following Murphy et al. (1989), I will take the substitution of
IRS technologies for CRS ones to mean industrialization.
Market Structure and Prices: Markets where goods sold are produced using the
traditional CRS technology are perfectly competitive. Thus, given the wage rate, wM ,
in manufactures a good q produced by a traditional technology fetches a price of ↵wM .
Firms using the IRS technology (and as a result having monopoly power) decide whether
to enter a market and what price to charge. Observe that the maximum price that can
be charged by a monopolist is ↵wM ; anything above would lead to the loss of the market
to its CRS competitors. To see that ↵wM is also the lowest price a monopolist would
charge note the following. Lowering the price below ↵wM would only be beneficial for a
monopolist if the decline in price is compensated by an increase in sales. However, given
the preferences adopted here, demand for commodity q is independent of the price of this
commodity. This is because consumers here demand one unit of each commodity type
following the order [0,1) until they use up the portion of their income devoted to the
purchase of manufactures. As a result, the demand for a given type q commodity depends
only on the prices charged in markets[0, q) and, thus, whether they have exhausted the
amount set aside for the purchase of manufactures. It is therefore independent of the
prices of commodities of type eq   q.
Entrepreneurs (those who start IRS industries) make profits, ⇡ of
⇡ = (pQ    wM)DQ   kwM = (↵   )(DQ   ⇢)wM + wM
where pQ = ↵wM and ⇢ ⌘ (k + 1)/(↵    ). Note that for an IRS-firm to be started
the potential entrepreneur should expect to earn an income that is at least as great as
her reservation income, i.e., ⇡   wM . Further, if ⇢ < 1 it is straightforward to see that
even with demand, DQ, as low as one unit, it is the case that ⇡ > wM so that the
IRS technology is always preferred to the CRS technology. To avoid this historically
counter-factual result, I will assume that ⇢ > 1.
2.2.3 The Labor Market and Agents
At this point in the discussion it is useful to consider the allocation of labor across diﬀer-
ent sectors. First, note that free mobility of labor across agriculture and manufactures
ensures that wA = wM = w. Second, given the mass, N, of the population and that of
landlords, M, we have the rest, L, of the population either supplying labor (Lf in the
agricultural sector and Lm in manufactures) or becoming entrepreneurs, E, and starting
IRS firms. A mass LCR of the manufacturing workers are employed in the CRS sector,
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while a mass, LIR are in the IRS sectors. To sum up, we have
N = M + L, L = Lf + Lm + E, Lm = LCR + LIR.
Though so far we have determined the the number of workers in agriculture, the
number employed in the CRS and IRS sectors in manufactures and the number of en-
trepreneurs remain to be calculated. Further, the determination of the allocation of
agents across sectors is tied closely to the question of the relative sizes of these sectors
and, therefore, the level of industrialization.
2.3 Industrialization Before the Industrial Revolution
Since the main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of property rights
in land on the extent of “industrialization” during the period leading to the classical
industrial revolution in England, it is useful to adopt the following strategy. First, re-
call the division of pre-industrial revolution Europe into three regions which diﬀer with
respect to the distribution of rights to land. One way of measuring such diﬀerences in
the context of the present model is to suppose that the two extremes of highly concen-
trated land ownership in eastern Europe (with its “second serfdom”) and widely-diﬀused
property rights in western Europe are represented by a small number of landlords in the
former and a relatively large number in the latter. Northwestern Europe (England and
the Low Countries) would then have a landlord class the size of which is somewhere in
between these two extremes. Formally, I assume that
Assumption 2. MPOL < MEN < MFR
where for mnemonic purposes only I used superscripts POL, EN, and FR to denote
eastern, northwestern, and western Europe (Poland, England, and France as represen-
tatives of their regions). For any given amount of land, this formulation yields relatively
large and small landholdings respectively in eastern and western Europe, while the av-
erage land held by northwestern European landlords lies somewhere in between. The
reverse ranking holds, ipso facto, for average land rents r = R/M.
Second, I am interested in how such property rights in land interact with (i) the
recovery of the population everywhere in Europe starting at the beginning of the three
centuries in question, (ii) the productivity improvements in agriculture observed simul-
taneously, and (iii) with the diﬀerential response of wages to these developments. Recall
that in this period continental real wages fell, while real wages in northwestern Europe
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remained trendless. Here the task is to replicate this result most importantly for west-
ern and northwestern Europe as wages in eastern Europe, where serfdom reigned, should
be thought as politically determined given the ability of landlords there to impose and
maintain strict restrictions on labor.35 To be able to explain the diﬀerence between
western and northwestern wage patterns it is useful to start with the observation that
the recovery of population levels everywhere were associated with productivity improve-
ments.36 Here I will follow the Boserup (1981) and Galor and Weil (2000) line of thought
that suggests that the former induced the latter.
Formally, I start by supposing that workers get paid their marginal products in
agriculture in western and northwestern Europe. Given goods market equilibrium in
agriculture (equation (8)) we obtain
dw
dN
=
w
N
✓
1  ⌫L
⌘L
◆
("A,N   ⇠) (9)
where ⇠ ⌘   ⌫L(⌫A⌘L ⌫L⌘A) > 0, and ⌘L ⌘ (@F (⇧)/@Lf )(Lf/F (⇧)), ⌘A ⌘ (@F (⇧)/@A)(A/F (⇧)),
"A,N ⌘ (@A/@N)(N/A), ⌫L ⌘ (@FL(⇧)/@Lf )(Lf/FL(⇧)) < 0, ⌫A ⌘ (@FL(⇧)/@A)(A/FL(⇧))
are defined as the elasticity of agricultural output with respect to labor (⌘L) and agricul-
tural productivity (⌘A), the elasticity of the marginal productivity of agricultural labor
to labor (⌫L) and agricultural productivity (⌫A), and the Boserupian parameter "A,N
that measures the elasticity of agricultural productivity to population.
Thus, whether wages rise or not in response to an increase in the level of population
depends on whether "A,N   ⇠ is positive or not. Note that though the elasticity of
productivity with respect to population, "A,N = (dA/dN)(N/A), is a purely technical
“blackbox” parameter, one would not expect it to exceed one. So, the answer to our
question lies in the value of ⇠. To see what is involved, specialize the production function
35Allen (1998) finds that though Polish agricultural productivity levels were among the highest mea-
sured in Europe, they did not translate into high wages for workers and argues that the “second serfdom”
accounts for the discrepancy.
36The thesis put forward by Brenner (1982) that it was the larger size of the farms in England
that made them more productive than their smaller counterparts in France is highly controversial
(see, for instance, Keyder and O’Brien (1978) and O’Brien (1996)) and runs counter to the findings
of contemporary empirical studies that find robust evidence for the inverse farm size and productivity
relationship (see Binswanger et al. (1995), Eastwood et al. (2010), and Carletto et al. (2013)). For a
diﬀerent take on the latter see Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014). Finally, note that Herrington et al.
(2015) find that in US data sectoral diﬀerences in labor–augmenting technological progress are the main
force behind the trends in observed relative prices and sectoral labor.
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to the CES form:
F (T, Lf , A) = A
⇥
aT & + (1  a)L &f
⇤ 1/& (10)
where a is a distribution parameter and & denotes the usual substitution parameter. It
then follows that
⇠ =
1
1 + 1 aa  ⌧
&
< 1 (11)
where ⌧ ⌘ T/Lf is the land-labor ratio in agriculture. Now, most empirical studies find
the elasticity of substitution   = 1/(1 + &) to be in the 0.4 to 0.6 range. This implies
that & > 0 (and taking   = 0.4 yields & = 1.5). As long as & > 0, it is clear from above
that ⇠ is decreasing in ⌧ , i.e., countries with higher land-labor ratios in agriculture would
have lower values of ⇠ and, therefore, are more likely to have their wages rise in response
to an increase in population. Allen (1998) and O’Brien (1996) point out that England
was a country with a land-labor ratio in agriculture that is higher than France. Thus,
we have reason to defend the view that England was more likely to have wages remain
high in response to the recovery of its population.
Note also how the share of labor in agriculture responds to an increase in population:
dLf
dN
=
Lf
N
(1  "A,N)

1 +
a
(1  a)⌧ &
 
. (12)
Again, as long as & > 0, it is clear from above that countries with higher land-labor
ratios in agriculture, ⌧ , would have proportionately smaller increases in the share of
labor in agriculture. Note also that a higher ⌧ makes the elasticity, (dLf/dN)(N/Lf ),
more likely to be less than one so that a one percent increase in population would lead to
a less than a one percent rise in the agricultural labor force, reducing the latter’s share in
total population. This also agrees with the historical accounts that show that a smaller
percentage of the population in England than in France was engaged in agriculture in
the period in question (see O’Brien (1996) among others).
Finally, to see how rents respond to an increase in population note that R = Q wLf .
Diﬀerentiation now yields
dR
dN
=
R
N
⇢
✓
1
1      "A,N
◆
. (13)
Given that   < 1, this implies that rents rise with an increase in population.
To sum up, so far I have argued that the recovery of European populations at the
beginning of our period was associated with an increase in agricultural productivity. This
had diﬀerent eﬀects on real wages and the allocation of labor across sectors depending on
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the inherited regime of property rights in land in diﬀerent regions of Europe. Thus, given
the relatively large landholdings, real wages in northwestern Europe remained roughly
the same, whereas population increases combined with smaller plots of land in western
Europe and serfdom in eastern Europe had the eﬀect of reducing real wages. Rents on
land rose everywhere (in proportion to initial rents per capita; see equation (13)).
I now turn to the consequences of these changes in real wages and rents on the
structure of the manufacturing sector.
2.3.1 Manufactures
The Structure of Demand for Manufactures: Agents’ demands for manufactured goods
are given by Qi = (C i   eC)/↵w = (1  ⌫)(I i   eC)/(↵w). Thus,
QL = (1 ⌫)wl
W + bW   eC
↵w
, QR = (1 ⌫)R/M + b
R   eC
↵w
, QE = (1 ⌫)⇡ + b
E   eC
↵w
,
or, defining   ⌘ eC/w ⌘ ewel/w (ratio of subsistence income to wages) and   ⌘ r/w ⌘
R/Mw (ratio of per-landlord rents to wages), ✓ ⌘ (↵    )/↵ (the rate of profit) and
recalling that C i = wli + yi, at a steady state
QL =
l
W    
↵
, QR =
    1
↵
+QL =
     
↵
, QE = ✓(DQ   ⇢) +QL. (14)
Note that if workers earn just enough to cover subsistence expenditure on food (i.e.   = el
as when w = ew), QL = 0.
The following results prove useful in what follows.
Proposition 1. Q¯L < ⇢
Proof. Noting that lW < 1, we have QL < Q⇤L ⌘ (1    )/↵. If we can show that
Q⇤L < ⇢ we are done. Suppose that on the contrary Q⇤L > ⇢. Given the definitions we
then have (1    ) > ↵(k + 1)/(↵    ). This implies 1   ↵(k + 1)/(↵    ) >  . Or,
0 >  (↵k +  )/(↵   ) >     0, a contradiction.
Assumption 3. r   2w. That is landlords earn at least twice as much as workers.
Proposition 2. Maintain Assumption 3. Qˆ ⌘ ✓(QL+M   ⇢) +QL < QR with M < ⇢.
Proof. With M < ⇢, Qˆ < Qˇ ⌘ (1 + ✓)QL = (2   v)QL (where v ⌘  /↵ = 1   ✓).
If we can show that Qˇ < QR we are done. Now, suppose Qˇ > QR. Using (14), this
implies 1 > (1   v)(1    ) > (    1). But 1 >     1 ) 2 >   = r/w ) 2w > r. A
contradiction.
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I now turn to the discussion of how the various European regions fared in terms of
developing their manufacturing sectors given the regime of property rights they inherited.
Recall that this regime determined how they responded to the recovery of population
levels in the period in question. Most importantly, we are interested in the real wages
of workers and rents on land as these determined the demand for manufactured goods.
The latter, was aﬀected, ceteris paribus, by the number of landlords in each economy.
Thus, of particularly interest here is that subspace of the parameter space M to which
each M i (i = EN, FR, POL) belongs. The modeling strategy that I follow below is
to parse this space so that each European region falls into a subspace which yields a
historically roughly accurate characterization of the region’s economy for the period in
question.
2.3.2 Northwestern Europe
Here we need to determine the “extent of industrialization” and the “extent of the man-
ufacturing sector” in northwestern Europe. Recall that in this case real wages remained
roughly constant when population levels rose. In line with comparative historical evi-
dence, I will make the following two assumptions for northwestern Europe.
Assumption 4. w > ew.
Thus, workers demand manufactures.
Assumption 5. M < ⇢ < M +QL.
That is, while the numbers of landlords is not high enough to generate demand for
manufactures suﬃcient to cover fixed costs in IRS sectors, those sectors that receive
demand M +QL can cover fixed costs and switch to the IRS technologies.
Assumption 6. M < M < MEN
Assumption 6 has two parts. M < M (where M ⌘ R/⇡ with DQ = N) implies
that the number of landlords is so high that the richest entrepreneur receives income ⇡
higher than the income R/M of a landlord.37 M < MEN (where MEN is defined by
R/(wM
EN
)    = ✓(MEN   ⇢) + (1+ ✓)QL/(1  ✓) and obtained from Q2 = QR) places
an upper bound on the number of landlords so that their incomes exceed the wages of
37The richest entrepreneur is the one whose good is bought by the most. With all agents buying some
IRS manufactures, there are some goods that all agents buy.
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workers by an amount given by the productivity diﬀerential between the CRS and IRS
sectors.38
Now, given w > ew, everyone, N, demands manufactures. Since their number, N,
exceeds that required to cover fixed costs, those sectors with mass QL that receive
everyone’s demand initially industrialize. The QL entrepreneurs who receive DQ = N
demand Q = ✓(N   ⇢) + QL (Q > QR because the richest entrepreneur is richer than
a landlord). Those QR entrepreneurs39 receive DQ = M + QL and demand Q1 =
✓(M +QL   ⇢) +QL < QR (inequality follows from Proposition (2)). Similarly, the Q1
entrepreneurs who receive DQ = M+QL+QR demand Q2 = ✓(M+QL+QR ⇢)+QL <
QR ( by Assumption (6)) and the Q2 entrepreneurs who receive DQ = M + QL + Q1
demand Q3 = ✓(M+QL+Q1 ⇢)+QL. This describes a sequence the elements of which
are Qi+2 = ✓(M + QL + Qi   ⇢) + QL for i    1 (with Q 1 = 0 and Q0 = QR). The
Appendix describes the solution to this recursive equation and some useful properties of
the sequence. It also shows that Qi < QR (i   1). This is used to establish the following
result.
Proposition 3. The extent of industrialization in northwestern Europe is given byeQEN = QENR .
Proof. QR entrepreneurs receiveDQ = M+QL > ⇢ so they industrialize. GivenQi < QR
(i   1) the mass of sectors using the IRS technology is bounded from above by QR.
Aggregate demand that generates profits of the industrialized sector is calculated in
Appendix 1 as:
[N   (⌦+QR)]QL + (⌦  ⇢)
1  ✓ (QR  QL) +
(⌦+QR   ⇢)
1  ✓ QL (15)
Note that the quantities (⌦+QR   ⇢)QL and (⌦  ⇢)(QR  QL) have multiplier eﬀects
(with 1/(1  ✓) as the multiplier, where ✓ is the rate of profit), while [N   (⌦+QR)]QL
does not generate further profits through the multiplier.
38The required ratio is historically justified. To have a sense of what is required, note that the
condition M < MEN is equivalent to the condition 12
  1
1   >
↵  
  or
QR
QL
> 2↵    1. Thus, even when the
IRS sector is twice as productive as the CRS sector, we require that landlords be able to purchase only
3 times more than wage-earners. Historically, this number is much higher. Note that Assumption (6),
which is suﬃcient but not necessary, is needed below to have Q2 < QR.
39This is because QL < ⇢ entrepreneurs cannot by themselves generate enough demand for IRS
sectors. Only those sectors that receive the combined demand of QL entrepreneurs andM landlords can
industrialize. These sectors have mass QR, the range which both the landlords and richest entrepreneurs
can aﬀord.
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2.3.3 Western Europe
We start by making a crucial assumption that restricts us to a subspace of the parameter
space.
Assumption 7. M > ⌘. Thus QR < ⇢.
Assumption 7 (where ⌘ is defined as that M for which QR = (R/M   w)/aw = ⇢
holds) formalizes the idea that in this case property rights in land are so diﬀuse that
landlord income, and, thus, expenditures on manufactures are low. It is then natural to
make a second assumption here.
Assumption 8. M < M < MFR.
where I define M¯FR by ✓(MFR + QL + QR(M
FR
)   ⇢) + QL = QR(MFR). The
implication of Assumption 8 is that each landlord is poorer than the richest entrepreneur
but there is an upper limit on the income of the second-tier entrepreneurs such that their
demand ✓(M +QL +QR   ⇢) +QL falls short of QR.
Here again given w > ew, initially everyone, N, demands manufactures. Since their
number, N, exceeds that required to cover fixed costs, those sectors with mass QL that
receive everyone’s demand initially industrialize. Reasoning similar to the northwestern
European case above yields Qi+2 = ✓(M +QL +Qi   ⇢) +QL for i   1 as the recursive
equation that governs the sequence of demands. Reasoning identical to the one discussed
in the Appendix shows that here we also have Qi < QR (i   1), which can then be used
to establish the following result.
Proposition 4. The extent of industrialization in western Europe is described by eQFR =
QFRR .
Proof. QR entrepreneurs receiveDQ = M+QL > ⇢ so they industrialize. GivenQi < QR
(i   1) the mass of sectors using the IRS technology is bounded from above by QR.
2.3.4 Eastern Europe
The eastern European case is straightforward and characterized by the following two
assumptions.
Assumption 9. MPOL < ⇢.
Assumption 10. wPOL < ew.
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That is, in eastern Europe the land distribution is very concentrated (M < ⇢), and,
thus, the landlords have very high levels of income, R/M . Further, wages are kept low
by political means (say at w = ew). These immediately yield the following result.
Proposition 5. There exists no IRS sectors in eastern Europe: eQPOL = 0.
Proof. Given MPOL < ⇢ landlords cannot generate enough demand by themselves to
cover fixed costs in any IRS sector. Given w = ew, workers do not buy any manufactures.
Thus, there is not enough demand for an IRS sector to break even.
2.3.5 First Great Divergence
We can now bring together the results for the three diﬀerent regions. Given assumption
2 it is natural to have rFR < rEN < rPOL. Given Assumptions 6 7, we also have
QFRR < Q
EN
R . We can now rank the “industrialized”, i.e. IRS manufacturing, sectors of
the three regions.
Proposition 6. eQEN > eQFR > eQPOL = 0.
Proof. This follows directly from Propositions 3, 4, 5, and QFRR < QENR .
Thus, northwestern Europe ranks as the most advanced economy, followed by western
and eastern Europe. This last region is characterized by the absence of any manufactur-
ing sectors using IRS technologies. The manufactures produced using CRS technologies
there are only bought by landlords who are not numerous enough to support industrial-
ization.
2.3.6 Dynamics
To see how these three regions move from one steady state to another in response to the
increase in population levels and the associated improvements in agricultural technology,
recall that rents on land increased everywhere, while wages fell in western and eastern
Europe, remaining roughly constant in northwestern Europe.
Consider first the eﬀects of a decrease in wages, w. Across steady states, this has
no eﬀect on labor supply (see equation (4)), reduces bequests (equations (5) and (6)),
and QL and raises QR (as it raises       = (r   ec)/w) (equation (14)). On impact as
wages fall, so does labor supply. Along the transient path, as bequests decline adjusting
to their new lower steady-state level, labor supply recovers, but remains lower than its
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previous long-run level until it reaches the new steady state.40 As wages remain roughly
constant and higher than elsewhere in northwestern Europe, labor supply there remains
higher than the other regions throughout.
To see how QL changes on impact note that though lower wages reduce the incomes
of workers they also lower the relative price of manufactures. Formally, we have
dQL
dw
=
1
[(⌘c + ⌘b + ⌘l) ⌘cw2↵]
{✓ [⌘l⌘b + (⌘c + ⌘b + ⌘l) ⌘c] + b⌘c [1  (⌘c + ⌘b + ⌘l)]}
which, making the reasonable assumption that 1   (⌘c + ⌘b + ⌘l), implies that dQL/dw >
0 so that QL falls on impact. Along the adjustment path as bequests fall, labor supply
rises creating an ambiguity. But, taking both of these eﬀects into account we find that
dQL
db
=
1
↵w

1  ⌘l
⌘c + ⌘b + ⌘l
 
> 0
so that QL falls along the adjustment path as well. Thus QL falls on impact, along the
adjustment path, and across steady states.
With wages falling and R rising, it is straightforward to show that QR rises all along.
Though wages remain unchanged in GB, rents rise so does QGBR . The bequests of
landlords also rise along the adjustment path and across steady states everywhere. With
QR determining the extent of industrialization, Proposition (6) holds.
3 Conclusion
Above I built a model that may shed some light on the diﬀerent and divergent paths
followed by various European regions in the period leading up to the classical industrial
revolution. The point of this exercise was to point out formally that though industrial
revolution was a break with the past, it was not as radical a break as once thought
and had a gestation period that went beyond a few decades and generations. This
long period witnessed a divergence across regions and reversals of fortune. The thesis
advanced here is that what lies at the root of divergent paths followed is the variety
of property rights inherited. Thus, when populations everywhere in Europe recovered
slowly from the shock they received, it was the size of the landlord class and their
40Is is interesting to note that peasants in many regions in France practiced “human hibernation.”
With no work to perform they would entomb themselves in their homes for months at a time, spending
their days in bed and sleeping most of the time to lower their metabolic rates and prevent hunger. See
Robb (2007).
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landholdings that mattered. In western Europe where peasant proprietors tilled small
plots, increases in population levels and advances in agricultural productivity led to lower
real wages. Given the low incomes of landlords and peasants demand for manufactured
goods remained low and increasing returns to scale technologies did not have much room
to expand. At the other extreme, in eastern Europe, second serfdom kept wages low,
and rents high. But given the small size of the land-owning class, these rents could not
generate enough demand for high-end manufacturing processes either. Northwestern
Europe, being located somewhere in between these two extremes, in terms of the size of
both the landholding classes and their plots, prospered as wages failed to decline even
when population levels rapidly rose. Combined demand from landlords and workers
kindled an expansion of the manufacturing sectors using increasing returns technologies.
Ultimately then the moral of the story formalized here is that property rights mattered
in determining the divergent paths taken by the three regions.
Appendix
A. Consider the recursive equation Qi+2 = ✓(M + QL + Qi   ⇢) + QL for i    1
(with Q 1 = 0 and Q0 = QR). It is straightforward to establish the following
1. Q1 < Q2 < QR. The first inequality follows from Q2 Q1 = ✓QR > 0. The second
inequality follows Assumption (6). One can also show that Qi < QR (i   1). This
last point follows from
(a) Q2 < QR
(b) (Q2i+2  Q2 < 0, (i   1)). That is all even Qi are less than Q2.
(c) (Q2i+2 Q2i+1 = ✓i+1QR) > 0, (i   0)). That is all odd Qi are less than their
even counterparts.
(d) Q2i (i   1) fall at a decreasing rate (Q2i+2 Q2i = ✓i(Q2 QR) < 0, (i   1)).
Q2i+1 (i   0) rise at a decreasing rate (Q2i+3  Q2i+1 = ✓i+1Q1 > 0, (i   0)).
Both sequences converge to Q = (1  ✓) 1[✓(M +QL   ⇢) +QL].
2. The solution to the recursive equation is (with Qi (i = 1, 2) given)
Qi =
QR(1  ✓)
✓⇣p
✓
⌘i
+
⇣
 p✓
⌘i◆
+Q1
✓
2 
⇣p
✓ + 1
⌘⇣p
✓
⌘i
+
⇣p
✓   1
⌘⇣
 p✓
⌘i◆
2(1  ✓) .
B. To calculate the total demand (above ⇢) for the IT sector, we find the area of
rectangles (see Figure 1) above ⇢. Define ⌦ ⌘ M +QL. We then have as the total area
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N⌦+QR
⇢
QL
QL Q1 Q3 QRQ2Q4 Q¯
⌦+Q2
⌦+Q4
Q5
⌦
⌦+Q1
⌦+Q3
[N   (⌦+QR)]QL
(⌦  ⇢)(QR  QL)
(⌦+QR   ⇢)QL
Figure 1: Total Demand
above ⇢:  ⇢ = [(N   ⌦)QL +QR(⌦  ⇢)] +  o +  e where  o and  e refer to the areas
of odd and even numbered rectangles.
For the odd-numbered ones ( o), we have (with Q 1 = QL, Q0 = QR)
 0 = (Q1  Q 1)Q0 + (Q3  Q1)Q2 + (Q5  Q3)Q4 + ...
 0 =
1X
i=0
(Q2i+1  Q2i 1)Q2i
For the even-numbered ones we have
 e = (Q2  Q4)Q1 + (Q4  Q6)Q3 + ...
=
1X
i=1
(Q2i  Q2i+2)Q2i 1
When added these yield (after some manipulation) equation (15).
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